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1 Introduction
The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that the share of people lacking 
access to essential medicines1 worldwide is around 1.7 billon, approximately one-third 
of the world’s population.2 Lack of access to essential medicines is an especially serious 
problem for patients in developing and least-developed countries, where many people 
struggle just to survive from day to day. From the total number of people who lack 
access to essential medicines, an estimated 1.3 billion, that is to say, about 80%, live 
in low-income countries.3 The reasons why patients lack access to essential medicines 
are manifold and complex and will not be set out in this article. Often mentioned are 
prohibitively high medicines prices, which have been ascribed to the practice of the 
pharmaceutical industry of protecting their pharmaceutical products and processes from 
competition through patents. Whatever the exact reason for patients’ lack of access 
to essential medicines, the consequences can be disastrous both for the individual 
concerned and for society at large when taking into account the scale of the problem 
worldwide.
 Although many academics and (non-governmental) organisations have addressed 
this particular problem from various perspectives, the aim of this article is to illustrate 
the different approaches taken by two legal systems with regard to the justiciability of 
the right to health. Moreover, the article intends to demonstrate how allowing for the 
justiciability of the right to health can play a role in enhancing access to medicines for 
patients in developing countries. 
 For this purpose, and since access to medicines is closely related to the right to 
health, the article will fi rst examine the international right to health, as enshrined in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), focusing 
specifi cally on access to medicines. Secondly, this article will briefl y address the alleged 
non-justiciability of the right to health as a socio-economic right.4 The term ‘justiciability’ 
is used to refer to the degree to which an alleged violation of, in this case, a socio-
economic right can be reviewed before a judicial or quasi-judicial body.5 The traditional 
notion is that civil and political rights as negative rights, on the one hand, and social, 
economic and cultural rights as positive rights, on the other, are fundamentally different. 
Consequently, a number of arguments have been raised against the justiciability of 
socio-economic rights. A brief mention of these objections and the counter-arguments 
* Junior Researcher, Department of International and European Law,  Law Faculty, Maastricht University.
1  In this context, the term ‘essential medicines’ relates to the WHO’s defi nition: those medicines that 
‘satisfy the priority health care needs of the population.’ WHO, ‘The Selection of Essential Medicines’ 
(2002) 4 Policy Perspectives on Medicines at 1.
2 WHO, The World Medicines Situation (2004) at 61.
3 Id., at 63.
4 The terms ‘socio-economic rights’ and ‘social and economic rights’ are used interchangeably when 
referring to rights of a social and economic nature as incorporated in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
5 Fons Coomans (ed.), Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights; Experiences from Domestic Systems 
(Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia 2006) at 4; Christian Courtis, Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Comparative Experiences of Justiciability (International Commission of Jurists 
2008) at 1, 6.
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will be given. For a more comprehensive discussion, the reader is referred to the report 
written by Christian Courtis and published by the International Commission of Jurists.6 
It is the author’s view that the traditional dichotomy between civil and political rights 
and economic, social and cultural rights is outdated and oversimplifi ed. As argued by 
Courtis, the notion that social and economic rights by defi nition are non-justiciable is 
no longer tenable.7 Justiciability of socio-economic rights is not an either-or question 
but should be considered on a sliding scale. This leads us to the conclusion that the right 
to health cannot be considered non-justiciable on the basis of its defi nition as a socio-
economic right. Thirdly, case studies are conducted to illustrate the different approaches 
taken by two legal systems with respect to the justiciability of socio-economic rights. 
The countries this article will focus on are the Republic of South Africa and India. The 
emphasis here is on developing countries, since they struggle especially with public 
health problems, like the HIV/AIDS epidemic, where adequate access to anti-retroviral 
medicines is of the utmost importance to combat the spread of this disease. 
 Furthermore, it should be clearly stated that this article by no means presents an 
exhaustive examination of the case law in the countries under review and that it does 
not intend to make a comparison between the two legal systems to determine the best 
approach. Instead, these case studies are intended to serve as illustrations and, perhaps, 
as an inspiration for other countries dealing with similar public health problems. It is 
therefore also important also to consider the broader context, which indicates a trend, 
especially in developing countries in the South, towards more progressive protection of 
economic and social rights by both the legislature and the judiciary.8 However, this does 
not imply that allowing for the justiciability of the right to health should be considered 
the only or most effective way to ensure that states abide by their obligations concerning 
access to medicines.9
 This article consists of four sections, the fi rst of which is this introduction. The 
second section examines the right to health under international law to determine its 
content, specifi cally whether it includes access to essential medicines and the resulting 
obligations for states. Additionally, it addresses the alleged non-justiciability of the 
right to health as a socio-economic right. In the third section, two case studies will be 
conducted, setting out the different approaches by the South African and Indian legal 
system. The fourth and fi nal section will conclude the article.
2 The Right to Health in International Law
In order to adjudicate any right, it is essential that its content and the relevant state 
obligations are clear.10 Therefore, this section will examine the international right 
to health. The right to health has been included in a number of international legal 
documents, most notably Article 25 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and Article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.11 To determine the content of the international right to health, whether it 
includes access to essential medicines for individuals and the relevant state obligations 
in that regard, this article will make use of the authoritative interpretation of the right to 
health by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). Moreover, 
it will focus solely on the right to health as enshrined by the ICESCR which is one of 
the most important human rights covenants regarding social and economic rights. Due 
to constraints of time and space, other human rights instruments also protecting the right 
to health will not be addressed.12
6 Courtis, above n. 5.
7 Id., at 103.
8 Coomans, above n. 5, at 8.
9 Courtis, above n. 5, at 3.
10 Id., at 5.
11 At the time of writing (June 2009), the ICESCR had 160 states parties. The text of the Covenant can be 
found at:.http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm.
12 For example, Articles 11(1)(f) and 12 of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
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2.1 Content of the Right to Health under the ICESCR
The right to health is codifi ed in Article 12 ICESCR. It is a fundamental human right,13 
recognising:
The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health14
Article 12(2) ICESCR lists a number of steps to be taken by the states parties to the 
ICESCR to achieve the full realisation of the right to health.15
 The wording of Article 12 ICESCR is extremely broad, though it is clear that the 
right to health does not entail a right to be healthy.16 Consequently, it grants every human 
being a set of freedoms and entitlements enabling them to realise the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.17 In more general terms, the right to health 
can be divided into two broad components: a right to healthcare and the underlying 
preconditions for health.18 The fi rst component, timely and appropriate healthcare, 
includes preventative and restorative medical care directed at the individual; while the 
second component concerns the traditional areas of public health: access to safe and 
potable water, adequate supply of safe food and nutrition, a clean environment, safe 
and sanitary living conditions, vaccination and so forth.19 Thus, the right to health is 
intrinsically linked to and dependent on the realisation of a number of other human 
rights, such as the right to housing, food and clean water.20
2.1.1 General Comment No. 14
The rights enshrined in the ICESCR are further defi ned by the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In this section, therefore, the focus will be on 
the CESCR’s most important explanatory document with regard to the right to health: 
General Comment No. 14 on the right to the highest attainable standard of health.21 
General Comments are documents adopted by a treaty-monitoring body. These non-
binding comments by the CESCR are authoritative interpretations of states parties’ 
Discrimination against Women, Article 24 of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and Article 5(e)(iv) of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination.
13 Preamble to the UDHR; CESCR, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard 
of health (2000), UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, at § 1.
14 Article 12(1) ICESCR.
15 Article 12(2) ICESCR lists the following steps:
The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for:
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the 
healthy development of the child;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other 
diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness.
16 See also General Comment No. 14, above n. 13, at § 8. The wording used here (a right to health) may 
be misleading. The wording used by the CESCR in General Comment No. 14, which states that individuals 
have ‘a right to the highest attainable standard of health’ taking into account the individual’s biological and 
socio-economic preconditions and the state’s available resources, is therefore better. The use of the wording 
‘right to health’ in this article should thus be seen as a short form of the longer term (right to the highest 
attainable standard of health).
17 Id., at §§ 8-9.
18 Birgit C.A. Toebes, The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law (Antwerp-Groningen-
Oxford: Intersentia 1999) at 245-246; General Comment No. 14, above n. 13, at § 11.
19 Toebes, above n. 18, at 245-246; General Comment No. 14, above n. 13, at § 11.
20 General Comment No. 14, above n. 13, at § 3.
21 Id.
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obligations as laid down in the ICESCR.22 In General Comment No. 14, the CESCR 
states that the right to health has four essential and interrelated elements, the application 
of which will depend on the specifi c situation within a state party.23 These elements 
include:
 Availability: According to the CESCR, availability entails that ‘[f]unctioning public 
health and health care facilities, goods and services, as well as programmes, have to 
be available in suffi cient quantity within the State Party’. The precise nature of these 
facilities depends on various factors within that state party, including its developmental 
level. Such facilities will also include essential drugs as defi ned by the WHO Action 
Programme on Essential Drugs.24
 Accessibility: ‘Health facilities, goods and services have to be accessible to everyone 
without discrimination, within the jurisdiction of the State Party.’ Accessibility, 
according to the CESCR, has four overlapping dimensions. Firstly, accessibility must 
be ensured on the principle of non-discrimination; secondly, accessibility includes 
physical accessibility, meaning that health facilities, goods and services and underlying 
determinants of health must be within safe physical reach, also for rural areas; thirdly, 
accessibility includes economic accessibility, or affordability, requiring that health 
facilities, goods and services must be affordable for all; and, fourthly, accessibility also 
concerns the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas with regard to 
health issues.25
 Acceptability: ‘All health facilities, goods and services must be respectful of medical 
ethics and culturally appropriate’.26
 Quality: Finally, ‘health facilities, goods and services must also be scientifi cally and 
medically appropriate and of good quality.’27
 It can be concluded that the right to health under Article 12 ICESCR entails that 
essential medicines must be suffi ciently available and accessible, which means that 
they must not only be physically accessible but also affordable to all sections of the 
population, in addition to being culturally acceptable and of good quality. Now that the 
content of the international right to health has been determined, and we can conclude 
that access to essential medicines is part of the right to health, the following question is 
to assess states parties’ obligations in that respect.
2.2 General Principles Regarding States Parties’ Obligations under the 
ICESCR
States parties’ obligations with regard to all the rights enshrined in the ICESCR are 
found in its Article 2, which reads as follows:
1) Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.28
Article 2(1) ICESCR is the central provision of the Covenant. It states that states parties 
should progressively realise, to the maximum of their available resources, the rights laid 
down in the Covenant, and as such recognises that realisation of the rights protected 
by the ICESCR requires time and (fi nancial) resources. States parties will not be able 
to fully realise the ICESCR’s rights immediately upon ratifi cation or even within a 
22 Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (New York: Oxford University 
Press 2008, 2nd ed.) at 190-191.
23 General Comment No. 14, above n. 13, at § 12.
24 Id., at § 12(a).
25 Id., at § 12(b).
26 Id., at § 12(c).
27 Id., at § 12(d).
28 Article 2(1) ICESCR (emphasis added).
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short period of time.29 However, this does not entail that states parties are not required 
to act, sometimes even immediately, to realise the ICESCR’s rights. For example, the 
prohibition of discrimination30 is an obligation of immediate effect upon ratifi cation by 
a state.31 Although the full realisation of the rights may be achieved progressively, ‘steps 
towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after the ICESCR’s 
entry into force for the states concerned.’32 The Covenant further states that such steps 
should be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards realising the 
rights protected by the ICESCR.33 Although the obligation of progressive realisation 
as stated in Article 2(1) ICESCR seems less strong than its counterpart with regard to 
civil and political rights,34 it should not be interpreted as depriving the obligation of all 
meaningful content.35 Rather, it means that, as noted by the CESCR, ‘[s]tates parties 
have a specifi c and continuing obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as 
possible towards the full realisation’ of the right to health.36 Even in times of severe 
resource constraints, the Committee underlines that states parties are still obliged 
to ‘strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the 
prevailing circumstances.’37 The concept of progressive realisation complicates the 
monitoring of states parties’ compliance with their obligations under the ICESCR, since 
under this concept states parties’ obligations under the ICESCR are neither uniform nor 
universal and are dependent on the state party’s level of development and availability 
of resources.38 However, the Committee holds that there is a strong presumption that 
retrogressive measures, that is to say, measures which take a step back in fulfi lling the 
ICESCR’s rights, are not permissible under the ICESCR.39
 In General Comment No. 14, the CESCR has set out a number of general principles 
for determining states parties’ obligations under the right to health. In that regard, it has 
made use of the tripartite terminology of obligations.40 States parties must respect, that 
is to say, abstain from interference, protect, by preventing third parties from interfering, 
and fulfi l the right to health by adopting appropriate measures.41 The state party must 
at the very least ensure the satisfaction of a minimum essential level with regard to the 
right to health. The CESCR has developed the principle of ‘core obligations’, those 
obligations without which the ICESCR’s rights would be devoid of any meaning and 
relevance42 and which are therefore non-derogable.43 It has further stated that a state 
party can only attribute its failure to meet its minimum core obligations to a lack of 
29 Audrey Chapman and Sage Russell (eds.), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp-Oxford-New York: Intersentia 2002) at 5; CESCR, General Comment 
No. 3: The nature of states parties’ obligations (1990), UN Doc. E/1991/23, at § 9.
30 See Article 2(2) ICESCR, which states: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any 
kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.’ Additionally, Article 3 ICESCR reads: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural 
rights set forth in the present Covenant.’
31 General Comment No. 14, above n. 13, at § 30.
32 General Comment No. 3, above n. 29, at § 2.
33 Id., at § 2.
34 Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) reads as follows: ‘Each 
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.’
35 General Comment No. 3, above n. 29, at § 9; General Comment No. 14, above n. 12, at § 31.
36 General Comment No. 14, above n. 13, at § 31. See also, General Comment No. 3, above n. 29, at § 9, 
where the Committee stated that the concept of progressive realisation should be interpreted in the light of 
the overall objective, the raison d’être of the Covenant, namely the establishment of clear obligations for 
states parties to fully realise the rights under the Covenant.
37 General Comment No. 3, above n. 29, at § 11.
38 Chapman and Russell, above n. 29, at 5.
39 General Comment No. 14, above n. 13, at § 32.
40 Id., at § 33.
41 Id., at § 33.
42 General Comment No. 3, above n. 29, at § 10.
43 General Comment No. 14, above n. 13, at § 47.
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available resources if it can demonstrate that ‘every effort has been made to use all 
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those 
minimum obligations.’44 Guided by the Alma-Ata Declaration,45 the CESCR holds that 
states parties’ core obligations with regard to the right to health entail a number of 
duties, including the obligation to ensure the provision of essential medicines as defi ned 
by the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs.46
 So, according to the CESCR, states parties to the ICESCR have to comply with 
obligations that are twofold. Firstly, states parties to the Covenant have the obligation 
to progressively realise the fulfi lment of the Covenant’s rights; secondly, states parties 
also have immediate obligations under the Covenant, such as the prohibition of 
discrimination47 or the obligation to take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps towards 
fulfi lling the right to health.48 Thus, non-compliance with these obligations would result 
in a violation of a state party’s obligation under the right to health enshrined in Article 
12 ICESCR. The CESCR noted, in General Comment No. 14, that, when determining 
whether a state has violated the right to health, one must distinguish a state party’s 
inability from its unwillingness to comply with its obligations under the ICESCR.49 
Moreover, the CESCR stressed that, regardless of the circumstances, a state party has 
a non-derogable obligation to comply with the aforementioned core obligations. Non-
compliance with these core obligations, including the provision of essential medicines, 
cannot be justifi ed under any circumstances.50 Consequently, it has been argued that 
the core obligation to make essential medicines accessible and available throughout a 
state party’s jurisdiction is an obligation of immediate effect not subject to progressive 
realisation.51
 In General Comment No. 9 on the domestic application of the Covenant, the CESCR 
has elaborated states parties’ duty to give effect to the ICESCR in the domestic legal 
order.52 Here, the CESCR states that the implementation of the ICESCR within the 
domestic legal order must be considered in the light of two principles of international 
law:53 fi rstly, states parties should modify the domestic legal order as necessary to give 
effect to treaty obligations,54 and, secondly, everyone has ‘the right to an effective remedy 
by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted 
him by the constitution or by law.’55 The CESCR states that, although the ICESCR 
does not prescribe the manner in which states parties must implement the Covenant 
in their domestic legal order, the methods applied must be appropriate, fulfi lling their 
obligations under the ICESCR.56 In that regard, the need to ensure the justiciability 
of economic and social rights is relevant in order to determine the best way to give 
domestic legal effect to the ICESCR’s rights.57 It must be stated that the ICESCR does 
not contain a provision explicitly obliging states parties to provide judicial remedies.58 
However, in the CESCR’s view, not providing any domestic legal remedies for violations 
of economic, social and cultural rights can only be justifi ed if such remedies are not 
‘appropriate means’ within the meaning of Article 2(1) ICESCR or, considering the 
44 General Comment No. 3, above n. 29, at § 10.
45 WHO, ‘Declaration of Alma-Ata’, International Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, 
USSR (6-12 September 1978).
46 General Comment No. 14, above n. 13, at § 43.
47 Chapman and Russell, above n. 29, at 5-6.
48 General Comment No. 14, above n. 13, at § 30; Courtis, above n. 5, at 26.
49 Id., at § 47.
50 Id., at § 47.
51 Paul Hunt and Rajat Khosla, ‘The Human Right to Medicines’ (2008) 5/8 SUR – International Journal 
on Human Rights at 104.
52 CESCR, General Comment No. 9: The domestic application of the Covenant (1998), UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1998/24.
53 Id., at § 3.
54 See also Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: ‘A party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justifi cation for its failure to perform a treaty.’
55 Article 8 UDHR.
56 General Comment No. 9, above n. 52, at § 5.
57 Id., at § 7.
58 See, for example, Article 2(3) ICCPR.
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other means available, unnecessary.59 According to the CESCR, this will be diffi cult to 
demonstrate.60 However, it also notes that the right to an effective remedy need not be 
interpreted to require a judicial remedy.61 The next section briefl y addresses the alleged 
non-justiciability of socio-economic rights.
2.3 Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights Protected by the ICESCR
The justiciability of economic and social rights has been a contentious issue ever since 
the emergence of such rights. The debate concerning the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights is closely related to the traditional dichotomy between civil and political rights, on 
the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights, on the other.62 This dichotomy is 
argued to be relatively simple. Civil and political rights pertain mainly to guaranteeing 
personal liberties, ensuring individuals’ freedom and protection from interference by 
the state. They are thus categorised as negative rights, i.e. rights obliging the state not 
to interfere with one’s personal freedom and bodily integrity.63 Classic examples are the 
right to life, the prohibition of torture and the right to freely express oneself. Economic, 
social and cultural rights are considered a distinct set of rights demanding economic 
and social equality. They are categorised as positive rights, i.e. rights that require states 
to intervene, to act.64 Requiring a state to act generally involves the commitment of 
(fi nancial) resources. Examples of economic, social and cultural rights are the right to 
education, the right to food and clean drinking water, the right to health and the right 
to work. This dichotomy has been reinforced at the international level by the adoption 
of two separate human rights covenants in 1966: the ICCPR, which provided for an 
individual complaints mechanism from the beginning through an optional protocol, and 
the ICESCR, which only recently included an optional protocol allowing individual 
communications (see below).
 To be effective and achieve their purpose, namely to guarantee that humans can 
live their life with dignity, human rights must be enforceable and, at least to a certain 
extent, justiciable. Here, justiciability65 refers to ‘the ability to claim a remedy before an 
independent and impartial body when a violation of a right has occurred or is likely to 
occur.’66 The possibility for victims of human rights violations to claim a legal remedy 
and receive adequate reparation is an essential aspect of a fully fl edged right.67 However, 
a number of arguments have been raised against the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights. The main arguments are that economic and social rights (positive rights) are 
fundamentally different from civil and political rights (negative rights) and that it is the 
specifi c characteristics of socio-economic rights that make them unsuitable for judicial 
review.68 It has been argued that socio-economic rights are too vague or imprecise, 
making it impossible to adequately determine the content and ensuing obligations of 
such rights, and that they are aspirations or political goals but not enforceable rights.69 
59 General Comment No. 9, above n. 52, at § 3.
60 Id., at § 3.
61 Id., at § 9.
62 In addition to this dichotomy, and as a result of the growing interdependence of states and issues of 
global importance, a third set of human rights emerged, that of collective or solidarity rights. Examples 
include the right to development, peace or a clean environment. Tomuschat, above n. 22, at 25.
63 Id., at 25 et seq.
64 Id., at 25 and 28 et seq.
65 In this regard, a distinction must be made between the ‘enforcement’ and ‘justiciability’ of human 
rights, although both concepts are closely related. Enforceability identifi es the entitlements and duties 
created by a legal system that must be maintained and executed, while justiciability entails the degree to 
which an alleged violation of a right can be reviewed before a judicial or quasi-judicial body at the domestic 
level. See Coomans, above n. 5, at 4; J.K. Mapulanga-Hulston, ‘Examining the Justiciability of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ (2002) 6 The International Journal of Human Rights at 36-37.
66 Courtis, above n. 5, at 6.
67 Id. A number of international human rights instruments have incorporated a right to a remedy in case 
of human rights violations. See, for example, Article 8 UDHR, Article 2(3) ICCPR, Article 13 CAT and 
Article 6 ICERD.
68 Courtis, above n. 5, at 10; Tomuschat, above n. 22, at 54; Mapulanga-Hulston, above n. 65, at 40.
69 Courtis, above n. 5, at 15.
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Furthermore, socio-economic issues are considered core elements of national policy. 
Therefore, it is argued that it is not the place for the judiciary, as an undemocratic 
body, to determine the exact content and scope of socio-economic rights.70 It would be 
inappropriate for courts to decide on budget allocation, and this power should belong 
exclusively to the executive.71 According to this view, granting economic and social 
rights justiciability would seriously endanger the principles of separation of powers and 
democracy.72 In addition, it has been argued that judges lack the professional capacity to 
adequately analyse complex socio-economic cases.73
 It is the author’s view that the conceptual distinction between civil and political rights, 
on the one hand, and economic and social rights, on the other, is oversimplifi ed and 
outdated.74 Human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.75 
Consequently, both civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights 
should be considered on an equal footing, as they are both human rights and, thus, 
intrinsically linked to human dignity and fundamental to all civilised societies.
 Moreover, in the author’s view, the objections employed against legal enforcement of 
economic and social rights before the courts are not persuasive.76 Firstly, the argument 
that economic and social rights are too vague and imprecise to determine their content 
and resulting obligations for states is not convincing. At the outset, it must be stated 
that this is an issue that is not exclusively associated with socio-economic rights, but 
one that affects all rights, including broadly formulated civil and political rights, which 
have not been denied justiciability because of their broad nature.77 Moreover, as shown 
above, the CESCR has defi ned the content of the right to health and ensuing obligations 
for states. These include, in addition to an obligation to progressively realise the right 
to health, duties of immediate effect, which can be justiciable.78 The case studies below 
further illustrate that domestic courts are also able to specify the content of socio-
economic rights and the right to health in particular. Secondly, the traditional notion that 
civil and political rights only entail an obligation for the state to abstain from acting and 
therefore have no resource implications does not hold true.79 For example, the right to 
free and democratic elections cannot be enjoyed without establishing a cost-expensive 
electoral system, nor can the right to a fair trial be guaranteed without maintaining a 
court system and providing legal aid funding if necessary. So, civil and political rights 
also have certain positive elements requiring resource expenditure, just as economic 
and social rights also possess negative elements, as in the case of the prohibition of 
discrimination.80 Whether economic and social rights are categorically more resource-
intensive than civil and political rights is questionable, but their implementation is 
clearly context-dependent.81 However, it is a weak argument to contend that adjudication 
70 Ellen Wiles, ‘Aspirational Principles or Enforceable Rights? The Future for Socio-Economic Rights in 
National Law’ (2006-2007) 22 American University of International Law Review at 42-43; Courtis, above 
n. 5, at 73.
71 Courtis, above n. 5, at 83; Mapulanga-Hulston, above n. 65, at 40.
72 Courtis, above n. 5, at 73.
73 Danie Brand, ‘Socio-Economic Rights and Courts in South Africa: Justiciability on a Sliding Scale’, 
in Fons Coomans (ed.), Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights: Experiences from Domestic Systems 
(Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia 2006) at 225; Coomans, above n. 5, at 5; Courtis, above n. 5, at 89; Wiles, 
above n. 70, at 53.
74 Courtis, above n. 5, at 10.
75 As confi rmed by the UN World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action (1993), UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, at § 5; for a comprehensive discussion, see also Asjbørn Eide, 
‘Interdependence and Indivisibility of Human Rights’, in Yvonne Donders and Vladimir Volodin (eds.), 
Human Rights in Education, Science and Culture: Legal Developments and Challenges (2007).
76 For a more elaborate discussion of the arguments in favour of and against the justiciability of economic, 
social and cultural rights, see also Eric C. Christiansen, ‘Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-
Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional Court’ (2006-2007) 38 Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review; Courtis, above n. 5; Coomans, above n. 5; Mapulanga-Hulston, above n. 65; Wiles, above n. 
70.
77 Courtis, above n. 5, at 15.
78 Id., at 26-27.
79 Id., at 11; see also General Comment No. 9, above n. 52, at § 10.
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of civil and political rights is ‘cheap’ compared to adjudicating socio-economic rights, 
which, it is argued, would result in policy making and signifi cant resource expenditure.82 
Possible budgetary implications as a result of adjudication have not prevented the 
justiciability of civil and political rights and should also not prevent the justiciability 
of socio-economic rights.83 Thirdly, as corroborated by the case studies below, there is 
no reason to assume that when adjudicating socio-economic rights, even in those cases 
where resource expenditure is necessary, the judiciary would not be aware of its position 
and respectful of the principle of separation of powers and the fact that resources are 
not unlimited.84 Furthermore, adjudication of socio-economic rights substantially 
strengthens the standing of such rights and contributes to the protection of the rights of 
vulnerable minority groups against abuse by the majority.85
 The notion that socio-economic rights are justiciable is further strengthened by a 
recent development within the international sphere: the adoption by the UN General 
Assembly of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights,86 on 10 December 2008, establishing a new quasi-judicial function 
for the CESCR.87 It allows the CESCR to receive and consider communications by 
individuals claiming to be a victim of a violation of any economic, social and cultural 
right protected under the ICESCR.88 In its preamble, the Optional Protocol reaffi rms 
the principle that all human rights and fundamental freedoms are universal, indivisible, 
interdependent and interrelated and also recalls that states are under an obligation to 
progressively realise the rights protected by the ICESCR. This is refl ected in Article 
8 of the Optional Protocol, which was infl uenced by the South African Constitutional 
Court’s jurisprudence,89 stating that
[w]hen examining communications under the present Protocol, the Committee shall consider the 
reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party in accordance with part II of the Covenant. In doing so, 
the Committee shall bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy measures for the 
implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant.90
Furthermore, Article 14 of the Optional Protocol establishes a trust fund with the 
aim of ‘providing expert and technical assistance to States Parties, with the consent 
of the State Party concerned, for the enhanced implementation of the rights contained 
in the Covenant’.91 It has been argued by representatives of developed states that the 
establishment of such a trust fund puts the Optional Protocol at risk of being ratifi ed 
only by developing states wishing to access the fund by claiming a lack of resources 
as a defence in cases where a complaint is raised against them.92 Developed states may 
be reluctant to ratify the Optional Protocol if they consider it possible that the Optional 
Protocol will impose higher standards upon rich countries.93 However, the reference 
in Article 8 to the standard of reasonableness and state discretion might mitigate this 
risk.94 It will take some time to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the Optional 
Protocol with regard to adjudicating violations of economic, social and cultural rights 
at international level.
 In conclusion, the international right to health enshrined in the ICESCR includes 
access to essential medicines. Moreover, the CESCR has set out a number of principles 
regarding states parties’ obligations under the right to health, including obligations of 
82 Courtis, above n. 5, at 83-84.
83 Id., at 84.
84 Wiles, above n. 70, at 47; Courtis, above n. 5, at 85.
85 Courtis, above n. 5, at 83.
86 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by 
General Assembly resolution A/RES/63/117 on 10 December10 2008 (hereinafter, OP-ICESCR). The OP-
ICESCR will be opened for signature at the signing ceremony scheduled for 24 September 2009.
87 Claire Mahon, ‘Progress at the Front: The Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2008) 8:4 Human Rights Law Review at 628.
88 Articles 1 and 2 OP-ICESCR.
89 Mahon, above n. 87, at 637.
90 Article 8(4) OP-ICESCR (emphasis added).
91 Article 14(3) OP-ICESCR.
92 Mahon, above n. 87, at 644.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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immediate effect and obligations subject to progressive realisation. The CESCR has 
authoritatively interpreted the right to health, in General Comment No. 14, as including 
availability and accessibility – both physical accessibility and affordability – of essential 
medicines. The CESCR has found that the provision of essential medicines is one of the 
states parties’ non-derogable core obligations. If a state violates the right to health, it 
is essential for the individual harmed to be able bring his or her claim before a (quasi-)
judicial body to be reviewed. Moreover, it is argued that the rigid traditional approach 
that socio-economic rights are by defi nition not justiciable, while civil and political 
rights are, is no longer tenable. This traditional approach is incompatible with the 
principle that all human rights are indivisible and interdependent.95 Both sets of rights 
encompass positive and negative duties, requiring different types of state measures and 
variable degrees of resources to fully realise these rights within a national setting. Thus, 
with regard to the justiciability of socio-economic rights, it is better to make use of a 
contextual approach where all rights – whether civil, political or socio-economic – are 
located somewhere along a ‘justiciability spectrum’.96
3 Domestic Approaches
At the national level, a number of constitutions recognise and protect economic and 
social rights, including the right to health.97 However, these rights are less frequently 
considered justiciable for many of the reasons touched upon above.98 In this section, 
two case studies are presented to illustrate the different approaches taken by two legal 
systems with regard to the justiciability of socio-economic rights within the context 
of access to medicines. The emphasis is on developing countries, although the two 
countries under review, South Africa and India, cannot be considered representative 
of all developing countries. However, these two countries provide good illustrations of 
a larger trend towards the more progressive protection of socio-economic rights, one 
aspect of which includes allowing for the justiciability of socio-economic rights.99
3.1 South Africa
The South African Constitution includes a Bill of Rights that guarantees civil and 
political rights and social and economic rights on an equal footing.100 It allows for the 
judicial review of legislation and executive policies and thus explicitly renders the 
rights protected in the Bill of Rights justiciable.101 As such, the courts in South Africa 
95 See also General Comment No. 9, above n. 52, at § 10.
96 Brand, above n. 73, at 226.
97 Courtis, above n. 5, at 4.
98 Lisa Forman, ‘Justice and Justiciability: Advancing Solidarity and Justice through South Africans’ 
Right to Health in Jurisprudence’ (2008) 27 Medicine and Law at 665. For an interesting discussion on the 
justiciability of economic and social rights within domestic systems, see Coomans, above n. 5; Courtis, 
above n. 5; and Hans V. Hogerzeil, ‘Is Access to Essential Medicines as Part of the Fulfi lment of the Right 
to Health Enforceable through the Courts?’ (2006) 368 The Lancet.
99 See also Aart Hendriks, ‘The Right to Health in National and International Jurisprudence’ (1998) 
5 European Journal of Health Law; John Cantius Mubangizi, ‘The Constitutional Protection of Socio-
Economic Rights in Selected African Countries: A Comparative Evaluation’ (2006) 2 African Journal 
of Legal Studies 1; Iain Byrne, Making the Right to Health a Reality: Legal Strategies for Effective 
Implementation (London: Commonwealth Law Conference 2005).
100 It should be mentioned here that South Africa is not a party to the ICESCR. It signed the Covenant 
on 30 October 1994 but has not yet ratifi ed it. However, many of the provisions in the South African 
Constitution are inspired by the text of the ICESCR. The Constitutional Court has also referred to the 
General Comments issued by the CESCR. See also, Margit Tveiten, ‘The Right to Health Secured HIV/
AIDS Medicine – Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa’ (2003) 72 Nordic Journal of International Law.
101 See Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certifi cation of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996) 4 SA 744 (CC) at § 78. Here, the Constitutional Court held 
that socio-economic rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable. See also Section 38 of the South 
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are required to interpret explicit provisions protecting socio-economic rights, and the 
South African Constitution also provides guidance for the courts when interpreting 
these rights.102
 An important provision with regard to the right to health is Section 27 of the South 
African Constitution,103 which reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to have access to … (a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
…
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realisation of each of these rights.104
Section 27 refers to a right of access to healthcare services, which seems to suggest it is 
narrower in scope than the international right to health protected by Article 12 ICESCR. 
The latter includes not only access to healthcare but also underlying preconditions 
for health. However, subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Section 27(1) and Section 24 (the 
right to a healthy environment) of the South African Constitution cover the underlying 
preconditions of health. Paragraph 2 of Section 27 mirrors the language of the ICESCR 
in that it requires states to take all reasonable legislative and other measures, within their 
available resources, to progressively achieve the realisation of the rights protected in the 
Constitution. Furthermore, Section 7(2) of the South African Constitution makes use of 
a similar typology of human rights obligations as established by the CESCR, requiring 
the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfi l the rights in the Bill of Rights.
 One of the very fi rst cases decided under the new South African Constitution 
regarding the right to health was the Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (Kwazulu-
Natal) case.105 The appellant, Mr Soobramoney, approached the Constitutional Court 
after being refused kidney dialysis treatment by a state hospital. The hospital justifi ed its 
decision on the basis of the limited number of machines available, which were also very 
expensive to operate. Therefore, the hospital employed strict criteria for selecting those 
patients who would benefi t most from the treatment. Mr Soobramoney, unfortunately, 
also suffered from ischemic heart disease and diabetes. As a result, the hospital was 
African Constitution, which reads: ‘Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent 
court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.’ 
102 See Section 39, which reads:
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum –
 (a)  must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom;
 (b) must consider international law; and
 (c) may consider foreign law.
(2)  When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights.
(3)  The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are 
recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that 
they are consistent with the Bill.
103 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) (hereinafter, the South African Constitution).
104 Section 27 of the South African Constitution further reads:
1. Everyone has the right to have access to –
 …
(b) suffi cient food and water; and
(c)  social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, 
appropriate social assistance.
…
3. No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.
105 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) (1997) Case CCT 32/97, 1 SA 765 (CC) 
(hereinafter, Soobramoney).
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unable to provide him with the dialysis treatment he requested. Mr Soobramoney argued 
that, on the basis of his constitutional right of access to healthcare services, he had a 
right to receive dialysis treatment.106
 The question arose to what extent the duty to respect the individual’s right to 
health had been breached by the state in refusing Mr Soobramoney access to medical 
treatment.107 The Constitutional Court held that, in these circumstances, the hospital had 
applied criteria compatible with the Constitutional provisions and used rational grounds 
for their decision.108 The selection process was not considered discriminatory because 
only health grounds were used to determine who would receive treatment. It stated that 
the right to healthcare services must be interpreted in the context of the availability of 
healthcare services in general. If Mr Soobramoney would be entitled to renal dialysis, 
such treatment could not be refused to other patients in similar positions, which would 
lead to a considerable expansion of the dialysis programme with severe fi nancial 
costs and at the expense of other people with greater health claims.109 In this case, the 
Constitutional Court acknowledged the doctrine of separation of powers and stated that 
a court would be slow to interfere with government decisions if these were rational 
and taken in good faith.110 Thus, it held that the denial of treatment did not breach the 
constitutional obligation to provide access to healthcare services.111 In doing so, the 
Court showed considerable deference to the government’s assertion that resources were 
insuffi cient to expand the dialysis programme.112 Thus, the South African Constitutional 
Court clearly considered the right to health to be justiciable. However, this did not mean 
that it would take no account of the principle of separation of powers and the fi nancial 
effects that a decision in favour of Soobramoney’s arguments would have had.
 The Soobramoney case led to much dismay in the South African human rights 
community. However, in a later case, the Constitutional Court was more willing to 
interfere with government decisions. The Government of the Republic of South Africa 
v. Grootboom case113 concerned the right to adequate housing guaranteed in Section 
26(1) of the South African Constitution and established the so-called reasonableness 
approach. Mrs Grootboom and her children, who lived in self-made shacks, were 
rendered homeless when they were evicted from a piece of land earmarked for low-cost 
housing. Mrs Grootboom went to court and claimed that the state was obliged to provide 
the homeless with shelter.114
 The Constitutional Court was faced with a case in which it had to decide whether 
or not the state had fulfi lled its obligation under the Constitution to progressively 
realise the right to adequate housing within its available resources. The Constitutional 
Court focused on the text of Section 26 of the Constitution and found the answer to 
be that the state must adopt reasonable legislative and other measures.115 As such, it 
developed the reasonableness test as the standard for evaluating state compliance with 
its constitutional obligations. The Court stated that, irrespective of how extensive and 
admirable the government’s housing programme was, some people were still left in 
106 Soobramoney, above n. 105, at §§ 1-7; Albie Sachs, ‘Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights’ (2006-
2007) 22 American University of International Law Review at 681-682. In his argument, Soobramoney also 
based his claim on the right to life and referred to the practice of the Indian Supreme Court in interpreting 
the right to life, specifi cally Paschim Banga Khet Samity v. State of West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37, which 
is discussed below. The Constitutional Court noted that the facts of that particular case where materially 
different to those of Soobramoney and that there was no need to infer a right to medical treatment from the 
right to life, since it was directly protected by Section 27 of the Constitution. See Soobramoney, above n. 
105, at § 18.
107 Brand, above n. 73, at 215.
108 Soobramoney, above n. 105, at §§ 24-25.
109 Id., at § 28.
110 Id., at § 29; Sachs, above n. 106, at 682-683.
111 Soobramoney, above n. 105, at § 36.
112 Forman, above n. 98, at 669.
113 Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom (2000) Case CCT 11/00, 1 SA 46 (CC) 
(hereinafter, Grootboom).
114 Grootboom, above n. 113, at § 4 et seq.
115 Id., at §§ 34-46.
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situations of extreme deprivation.116 The fact that it did not have any special emergency 
provisions for people living in such dire situations, as in the case of Mrs Grootboom, 
was unreasonable.117 Therefore, the Constitutional Court found that the government’s 
housing policy fell short of the requirements of Section 26(2) of the Constitution.118 
It also referred to the indivisibility of all human rights, stating that, when evaluating 
the reasonableness of state action, account should also be taken of the inherent dignity 
of human beings.119 Thus, the Court held that Section 26 of the Constitution had been 
breached and ordered the government to develop a comprehensive housing programme 
to remedy the situation.
 With regard to reviewing broad policy and legislative decisions to assess whether 
the state has complied with its socio-economic constitutional obligations, the diffi culty 
does not pertain to whether or not the state has taken any measures, as required by the 
second paragraph of Sections 26 and 27, but whether these measures are adequate.120 
Therefore, in order to assess state compliance with its constitutional socio-economic 
obligations, the Constitutional Court has established the standard of reasonableness, 
taking into account the state’s available resources and the fact that socio-economic 
rights cannot always be realised immediately but have to be realised progressively.121 
Consequently, a number of conditions for the reasonableness of state measures can 
be inferred from the Constitutional Court’s judgments.122 Firstly, to be reasonable, a 
state programme must clearly allocate responsibilities and tasks and ensure suffi cient 
fi nancial and human resources.123 Secondly, the programme must be comprehensive, 
coherent and directed towards the progressive realisation of the respective right within 
the state’s available means.124 Thirdly, mere legislation is not enough. Legislation must be 
complemented by policies and programmes that are reasonable both in their conception 
and implementation.125 Fourthly, reasonable measures must be balanced and fl exible and 
provide for possible crises situations. A programme that excludes a signifi cant segment 
of society cannot be reasonable.126 Finally, the state’s measure(s) must be transparent, 
which means that, in order to be properly implemented, a programme must be made 
known to all concerned.127
 With regard to the justiciability of socio-economic rights, the Grootboom case is an 
important milestone. The Constitutional Court reaffi rmed the justiciable nature of socio-
economic rights and, more importantly, set out the criteria for evaluating the state’s 
compliance with its constitutional obligations. The obligation to progressively realise 
the right to health, as required by Section 27(2), employs the same wording as Section 
26(2) with regard to the right to housing. Therefore, the reasonableness test applies 
equally to the right to health, as confi rmed in the following case.128
 A further important case with regard to the right to health and specifi cally addressing 
access to medicines is Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign.129 In this case, 
the government’s policy concerning the provision of the medicine Nevirapine, a medicine 
that is able to reduce the likelihood of transmission of the HIV/AIDS virus between 
mother and unborn child by 50%, was under review. The pharmaceutical manufacturers 
producing Nevirapine had made an offer to the South African government to supply 
116 Id., at §§ 52-53.
117 Id., at §§ 43 and 66.
118 Id., at §§ 69 and 99(c).
119 Id., at § 83.
120 Brand, above n. 73, at 220; Fons Coomans, ‘Reviewing Implementation of Social and Economic 
Rights: An Assessment of the “Reasonableness” Test as Developed by the South African Constitutional 
Court’ (2005) 65 Heidelberg Journal of Law 1 at 175-176.
121 Brand, above n. 73, at 220-221.
122 See also id., at 221-222; Forman, above n. 98, at 670-671.
123 Grootboom, above n. 113, at § 39.
124 Id., at §§ 40-41.
125 Id., at § 42.
126 Id., at § 43.
127 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (2002) Case CCT 8/02, 5 SA 721 (CC) (hereinafter, 
TAC) at § 123.
128 Forman, above n. 98, at 670.
129 TAC, above n. 127.
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the drug free of charge for fi ve years. However, Nevirapine was made available only 
in a small number of test sites throughout the country.130 The government justifi ed this 
restricted provision of the medicine on the basis of the necessity to study the effectiveness 
of a possible future nation-wide programme.131 Together with a number of doctors, the 
NGO Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) claimed, on behalf of pregnant HIV-infected 
women, that the state’s refusal to make Nevirapine available within the public sector 
was a violation of Section 27 of the South African Constitution.
 The Constitutional Court was unanimous in stating that the principle question here 
was not whether social and economic rights were justiciable – ‘clearly they are’132 – but 
whether the governmental measures adopted to provide access to healthcare services 
for HIV-infected mothers and their newborn babies fulfi lled the obligations under the 
Constitution.133 In this case, the very act of judicial review, in light of the doctrine 
of separation of powers, was at the heart of the state’s defence.134 The government 
acknowledged that the health ministry might be wrong in its decision. However, if so, 
it would be accountable to the public.135 The courts should not get involved in policy 
issues. On the other side, the TAC and the doctors referred to the Grootboom case 
and argued that not providing a medicine that was safe and had no cost implications 
was unreasonable.136 Referring back to its approach in the Grootboom case, the Court 
contended that the state’s policy to restrict the use of the drug Nevirapine to a limited 
number of test sites did not meet the reasonableness test.137 The government itself 
had stated that the cost of the medicine was not a factor in the decision to restrict the 
provision of Nevirapine.138 Therefore, any arguments centred on the lack of resources 
did not carry any weight. Furthermore, Nevirapine was safe and effective.139
 The Constitutional Court did not employ supervisory jurisdiction to assess the 
roll-out of the programme but decided that it would be suffi cient to declare the state’s 
obligations.140 In that respect, the Constitutional Court was reserved in its judgment and 
respected the separation of powers between the government and the judiciary. However, 
the Constitutional Court also made clear that respecting the principle of separation of 
powers did not mean ‘that courts cannot or should not make orders that have an impact 
on policy.’141 It therefore rejected the government’s argument that the Constitutional 
Court only had the power to issue a declaratory order.142 The Court’s refusal to employ 
supervisory jurisdiction led to some diffi culties with regard to the implementation of the 
judgment. It took several months of lobbying by the TAC before the authorities started 
supplying Nevirapine. This makes clear that a positive judgment in itself does not 
always bring about change and that ensuring effective implementation can sometimes 
be an even greater challenge.143
 The state is obliged to realise socio-economic rights within its available resources.144 
In that respect, the South African Constitutional Court has been hesitant to address the 
possible budgetary implications of enforcing the state’s constitutional obligations. In 
Soobramoney, the Constitutional Court accepted the state’s argument that resources 
were limited and access to treatment had to be rationed.145 This seems to point to 
130 Before being made available in these few research sites, the medicine Nevirapine had only been 
available in the private sector.
131 TAC, above n. 127, at §§ 51-55.
132 Id., at § 25.
133 Id., at § 25.
134 Id., at § 22; Forman, above n. 98, at 674.
135 Sachs, above n. 106, at 686.
136 Id., at 686.
137 TAC, above n. 127, at §§ 80-81.
138 Id., at § 48.
139 Id., at §§ 57-60.
140 Sachs, above n. 106, at 692; Forman, above n. 98, at 677.
141 TAC, above n. 127, at § 98.
142 Id., at § 106.
143 Byrne, above n. 99, at 10.
144 See the second paragraph of Sections 26 and 27.
145 Soobramoney, above n. 105, at §§ 24-28; Brand, above n. 73, at 223.
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an initial unwillingness to enforce positive duties under the right to health.146 In the 
TAC case, the issue regarding resources was less relevant, since the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer was willing to provide the medicine Nevirapine free of charge for a period 
of fi ve years.147 In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court affi rmed that the reasonableness 
standard is governed by the level of available resources and that the state is not required 
to do more than its available resources allow.148 The Constitutional Court stated that 
the reasonableness test may have budgetary implications but that it is not directed at 
rearranging budgets.149 Thus, the Constitutional Court has been willing to prioritise 
the needs of the vulnerable and poor over the government’s competing arguments of 
incapacity and resource constraints.150
 Notably, in both the Grootboom151 and TAC152 cases, the Constitutional Court rejected 
the arguments by the amici to recognise a minimum core obligation, as developed by the 
CESCR,153 within the right to housing and the right to health, respectively.154 The Court 
stated that identifying the core content of a right is a complex matter and that courts are 
ill-equipped to make wide-ranging factual and political enquiries to determine such a 
minimum core content.155 It did state that ‘there may be cases where it may be possible 
and appropriate to have regard to the content of a minimum core obligation to determine 
whether the measures taken by the state are reasonable.’156 Furthermore, another decision 
of interest for the issue of access to medicines is the 2005 New Clicks case,157 where 
pharmacies challenged government regulations that were intended to reduce medicine 
prices, partly through a fi xed dispensing fee for pharmacists.158 The Constitutional 
Court considered the constitutional importance of the governmental regulations aimed 
at making medicines more affordable and accessible159 and upheld the constitutionality 
of the regulations that provided for price controls.160 It confi rmed several times that 
the purpose of enhancing accessibility and affordability of medicines falls within the 
state’s constitutional obligations under Section 27.161 As such, it can be concluded that 
the right to health under Section 27 of the South African Constitution includes access to 
affordable medicines and corresponding state obligations.162
 In conclusion, although the South African Constitutional Court has decided against 
establishing the minimum core content of the right to health, it has demonstrated that it 
is possible to determine the content of the right to health and evaluate state compliance 
with its constitutional obligations in specifi c cases. The South African case law reaffi rms 
that the traditional distinction between civil and political rights, as imposing negative 
duties, and socio-economic rights, as imposing positive duties, no longer holds true.163 
Justiciability of economic and social rights should be considered on a sliding scale, which 
is the approach adopted by the South African Constitutional Court.164 In Grootboom, 
the Constitutional Court stated that the question is not ‘whether socio-economic rights 
are justiciable under the Constitution, but how to enforce them in a given case. This 
146 Forman, above n. 98, at 668.
147 TAC, above n. 127, at § 48; Brand, above n. 73, at 223.
148 Grootboom, above n. 113, at § 46.
149 TAC, above n. 127, at § 38.
150 Forman, above n. 98, at 677.
151 Grootboom, above n. 113, at §§ 29-33.
152 TAC, above n. 127, at §§ 26-39.
153 See above and also General Comment No. 3; for the right to health, see specifi cally General Comment 
No. 14.
154 Forman, above n. 98, at 671.
155 Grootboom, above n. 113, at § 33; TAC, above n. 127, at §§ 37-38.
156 Id., at § 33.
157 Minister of Health and Professor D. McIntyre No v. New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others 
(2005) Case CCT 59/04 (hereinafter, New Clicks).
158 The pharmacies argued that the fi xed dispensing fee would cause them to operate at a loss, destroying 
the pharmaceutical industry and hindering access to medicines. See New Clicks, above n. 157, at § 30.
159 Id., at § 16.
160 Id., at § 13.
161 Id., at §§ 84, 314, 514, 519 and 704.
162 Forman, above n. 98, at 679.
163 Id., at 666.
164 Brand, above n. 73, at 226.
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is a very diffi cult issue which must be carefully explored on a case-by-case basis.’165 
Consequently, the Constitutional Court developed the reasonableness test to assess state 
compliance with its socio-economic constitutional obligations. This is an innovative 
and fl exible approach that balances the institutional and democratic implications of 
enforcing socio-economic rights with the protection of society’s most vulnerable.166 
In that regard, the Constitutional Court has overcome many of the arguments posed 
against the justiciability of socio-economic rights. Even so, the Constitutional Court 
has not ignored the principle of separation of powers or arguments centred on the lack 
of resources. It should be noted, however, that one cannot always rely on the goodwill 
of offi cials to implement court orders, and the Constitutional Court may have to be 
more proactive when monitoring implementation of its decisions. Finally, in light of 
the above-mentioned case law, specifi cally the TAC case, it must be concluded that the 
justiciability of the right to health has ensured that accessibility and affordability of 
medicines are taken seriously by the state as part of an enforceable human right.
3.2 India
This section discusses India’s legal system of protecting and enforcing social and 
economic rights. The Indian Constitution, in its desire to ensure the welfare of the Indian 
people and social justice,167 protects civil and political rights as well as economic and 
social rights. However, it does make a distinction between the two sets of rights. Part 
III of the Constitution enshrines fundamental rights, including the traditional civil and 
political rights. These fundamental rights are directly enforceable and justiciable before 
a court of law.168 Economic and social rights, on the other hand, are incorporated in Part 
IV as Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP). Article 37 states that these DPSP 
‘shall not be enforceable by any court’, but that they are nevertheless fundamental in the 
governance of the country. Article 38 reaffi rms it is the state’s duty to strive to promote 
the welfare of the Indian people by securing and protecting a social order of justice.169
 An important element in the enhancement of the protection of socio-economic rights 
in India was the public interest litigation movement.170 India’s internal problems in the 
mid-1970s, which led to widespread human rights violations, resulted in a change of 
perception of the judiciary as regards the working of the Constitution. The judiciary 
acknowledged that the individualistic and adversarial nature of the existing system 
of litigation was ill-suited to the demands of the most vulnerable.171 Consequently, at 
the end of the 1970s, the Supreme Court used its constitutional powers172 to initiate a 
movement towards public interest litigation (PIL), a movement that was completely 
judge-led and judge-dominated.173 The judiciary considered that PIL provided a solution 
to many problems relating to the working of the Indian legal system.174 Firstly, the 
defi nition of standing was expanded to allow any individual to bring a case before the 
High Courts or the Supreme Court, even if that individual was not seeking any relief 
but acting on behalf or for the benefi t of an indeterminate group of people. Secondly, it 
is no longer required to submit a formal petition, written in legal language, before the 
Court. Instead, any letter addressed to the Court suffi ces. Thirdly, irrespective of how 
brief the facts of the case, the Court will proceed with the case as long as it is one of 
165 Grootboom, above n. 113, at § 20.
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167 See the preamble to the Indian Constitution.
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169 Sheetal B. Shah, ‘Illuminating the Possible in the Developing World: Guaranteeing the Human Right to 
Health in India’ (1999) 32 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law at 464-465.
170 S. Muralidhar, ‘Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights: The Indian Scenario’, in 
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genuine public interest. Additionally, the Court may appoint socio-legal commissions to 
gather and verify information.175 Finally, the Supreme Court has been able to formulate 
uniquely suited judicial remedies, often containing detailed enforcement mechanisms.176
 The Supreme Court’s most innovative step in protecting socio-economic rights is 
its recognition of the justiciability of socio-economic rights.177 The Supreme Court was 
initially conservative in its interpretation of the DPSP.178 This changed in the 1970s, 
when it decided that the fundamental rights under the Constitution and the DPSP were 
complementary.179 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, through creative interpretation, 
expanded the fundamental right to life, which traditionally entails an obligation for the 
state to abstain from interfering with an individual’s right to life and liberty, to include 
positive obligations for the state.180 It has thus overcome the arguments raised against 
the justiciability of socio-economic rights.181 The Supreme Court continued on this path 
and creatively interpreted the right to life to include ‘the right to live with human dignity 
and all that goes with it, namely, the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, 
clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse 
forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings’.182
 The Indian Constitution expressly protects the right to health in Article 47 of the 
DPSP,183 which reads:
The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the 
improvement of public health as among its primary duties.184
 As stated above, Article 37 of the Constitution precludes the justiciability of these 
DPSP. However, the Supreme Court has found a way around this by interpreting the 
right to health as forming part of the right to life protected under Article 21,185 making 
it directly enforceable and justiciable.186
 One of the fi rst cases in which the Supreme Court explicitly recognised the right 
to health (in this case of a worker) as an integral part of a meaningful right to life is 
the Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of India case.187 In subsequent 
cases, the Supreme Court has expanded the fundamental right to life, obliging the state 
to create the conditions necessary to ensure good health.188 Another important judgment 
relating to the right to health is the PIL case of Paschim Banga Khet Samity v. State 
of West Bengal.189 In that case, an agricultural labourer fell of a train and seriously 
injured his head. In seeking treatment, he was turned away by seven state-run hospitals 
because they lacked the necessary facilities for treating that type of injury or because 
of a lack of vacant beds. The Supreme Court had to address the question whether this 
non-availability of facilities for emergency medical treatment resulted in a breach of 
his fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.190 The 
Supreme Court fi rst stated that the Constitution envisaged the establishment of a welfare 
state, at federal and state level, in which it was the primary duty of the state to secure the 
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welfare of the people, including the provision of adequate medical facilities.191 It further 
stated that the preservation of human life was of paramount importance and that, under 
Article 21, the state had an obligation to safeguard the right to life of every person.192 
The Court thus reconceptualised the right to life to impose a positive duty on the state.193 
In the present case, the labourer’s right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution had 
been breached and he was awarded compensation by way of redress.194 In addition, the 
Supreme Court ordered a number of remedial measures to prevent a recurrence of such 
incidents in the future.195 
 In Paschim Banga Khet Samity v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court 
recognised, although implicitly, that emergency medical treatment is a core minimum 
of the broader right to health.196 It acknowledged that fi nancial resources were required 
to provide adequate facilities, but at the same it could not be ignored that the state 
had a constitutional obligation to provide adequate medical services to the Indian 
people. It reaffi rmed that the state could not avoid its constitutional obligations on the 
account of resource constraints.197 Concerning the issue of resource constraints, in State 
of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga,198 the Supreme Court had to address the question 
whether the state’s new policy, which reduced government employees’ entitlement to 
reimbursement of medical expenses incurred in a non-governmental hospital, violated 
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The State of Punjab argued that the reduction in 
entitlements to medical care was justifi ed by fi nancial constraints. It argued that no right 
under the Constitution is absolute, and that the right to life had to be balanced with 
need and available resources. The Supreme Court fi rstly acknowledged the principle of 
separation of powers, stating that, in questioning the validity of government policy, it 
is not within the domain of any court to weigh the pros and cons of such policy, except 
where it is arbitrary or in violation of any constitutional, statutory or other provision of 
law. It further stated that Articles 21 and 47 of the Constitution created a primary duty 
for the state to protect the health of its citizens and that fulfi lling this duty would require 
fi nancial resources. However, it went on to state that:
No State of any country can have unlimited resources to spend on any of its projects. That is why it only 
approves its projects to the extent it is feasible. The same holds good for providing medical facilities to its 
citizen including its employees. Provision of facilities cannot be unlimited. It has to be to the extent fi nance 
permits.199
Thus, the Supreme Court accepted the state’s justifi cation of resource constraints and 
held that the new policy did not breach Article 21. The right to health could not be 
absolute in a welfare state. In this judgment, the Court extended the state’s margin of 
appreciation.200 Although it had stated in previous cases that ‘whatever is necessary 
… has to be done’,201 the Court did not consider the right to health to be absolute. It 
is probably better to state that arguing resource constraints is not a legitimate excuse 
for the government to discharge its constitutional obligations. However, just as in the 
South African legal system, the Indian Supreme Court will take account of the available 
resources for realising socio-economic rights and grant the state a margin appreciation 
in achieving these rights.
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 Concerning the issue of access to affordable medicines, which, as has been shown 
above, is an element of the international right to health enumerated in the ICESCR, it is 
the author’s opinion that the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the fundamental 
right to life and its emphasis on health as the foundation for a meaningful life with 
dignity would appear to include access to medicines. This would be especially true for 
access to essential, life-saving medicines, which are a prerequisite for a healthy life 
with dignity. Furthermore, in another PIL case, Vincent Panikurlangara v. Union of 
India,202 where the Supreme Court was asked to ban a number of hazardous drugs, it 
stated that the state has an obligation to ensure that medicines are available at reasonable 
prices, so as to be within the common man’s reach. Moreover, the Allahabad High Court 
has also recognised the importance of protecting patients’ access to reasonably priced 
medicines.203
 In conclusion, in light of its case law and creative interpretation of the fundamental 
right to life, the Indian Supreme Court has played a crucial role in acknowledging the 
justiciable nature of the right to health. Even though the right to health, which is protected 
as a DPSP in the Indian Constitution, is considered non-justiciable,204 the Supreme Court 
has interpreted the fundamental right to life in such a manner to include a number of 
social elements.205 As such, the Supreme Court expanded the fundamental right to life, 
which traditionally entails an obligation for the state to abstain from interfering with 
an individual’s right to life and liberty, to include positive obligations for the state.206 It 
has, furthermore, issued instructions to the government to fulfi l its obligations under the 
Indian Constitution.207 The Supreme Court has been very progressive by interpreting the 
right to life to include socio-economic rights; but in State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya 
Bagga it did acknowledge the principle of separation of powers and accepted that 
resources are not unlimited and that the right to health could therefore not be considered 
absolute.208 The possibility of PIL, enabling a wide group of persons to bring a claim 
regarding alleged human rights violations before the Supreme Court, and the Court’s 
progressive attitude towards enforcing socio-economic rights have substantially 
strengthened the standing of socio-economic rights within the Indian legal system. This 
active stance of the Supreme Court and the judge-led movement to a system of PIL has 
also led to a heated debate on the limits of such overt judicial activism.209 However, the 
Supreme Court justifi es its active stance as being necessary to make up for the lack of 
a strong executive and legislature.210 The South African Constitutional Court referred 
to the approach of the Indian Supreme Court in its Soobramoney decision. In this 
decision, it noted that, unlike the Indian Constitution, the South African Constitution 
deals specifi cally with positive obligations imposed on the state. Where it does so, it is 
the Constitutional Court’s duty to apply the constitutional obligations and not to draw 
inferences that would be inconsistent with those obligations.211
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4 Conclusion
For human rights to be truly effective, they must be enforceable and justiciable. 
Justiciability, however, is not an absolute concept and should be considered on a sliding 
scale. The issue is not whether socio-economic rights are justiciable, but how domestic 
courts have adjudicated alleged violations of socio-economic rights. Therefore, this 
article has tried to illustrate how two legal systems have dealt with the arguments raised 
against the justiciability of socio-economic rights, specifi cally the right to health. In 
addition, it has tried to demonstrate how the justiciability of the right to health has – and 
can – play a role in enhancing access to medicines for patients in developing countries.
 Both legal systems have overcome the arguments raised against the justiciability of 
socio-economic rights and have thus substantially strengthened the standing of socio-
economic rights and the right to health within their domestic legal systems. This is 
in line with a broader trend towards a more progressive protection of socio-economic 
rights worldwide. It has been shown that it is possible to determine the content of the 
right to health. The authoritative General Comment No. 14 by the CESCR has played 
an important role in setting out a number of general principles relating to the content of 
and states parties’ obligations regarding the international right to health, which protects 
access to medicines. Although the South African Constitutional Court has rejected the 
minimum core content approach as developed by the CESCR, it did make clear that 
defi ning the minimum core content in a specifi c case could be relevant for the purpose 
of evaluating reasonableness. The reasonableness test, developed by the South African 
Constitutional Court to assess state compliance with its socio-economic constitutional 
obligations, is an innovative and fl exible approach balancing the institutional and 
democratic implications of enforcing socio-economic rights with the protection of 
society’s most vulnerable members. In several instances, the Constitutional Court has 
shown deference to the principles of separation of powers and democracy. As such, the 
South African approach is more cautious compared to the assertive stance of the Indian 
judiciary. Unlike the South African Constitution, which incorporates a justiciable right 
to health, the Indian Constitution protects the right to health as a DPSP not enforceable 
by any court. However, the Indian Supreme Court has been able to grant the right to 
health indirect protection through the justiciable right to life. Additionally, the Indian 
Supreme Court has, over a longer period, more frequently been willing to actively 
intervene in policy making, handing down detailed orders that often have signifi cant 
resource implications. Its willingness to enforce the right to health, despite the fact that 
the Indian Constitution has explicitly classifi ed socio-economic rights as non-justiciable, 
is remarkable. It illustrates that the Supreme Court has adapted its institutional role 
to enforce socio-economic rights and even impose positive obligations if necessary. 
Although this progressive attitude of the Indian Supreme Court has attracted criticism, 
along with the judge-initiated PIL movement, it has also led to a substantial strengthening 
of socio-economic rights in the Indian legal system.
 In conclusion, the case studies clearly illustrate that the notion that socio-economic 
rights as a category cannot be justiciable is seriously misguided.212 Giving victims of 
human rights violations – whether civil, political, economic or social – the possibility 
to claim a remedy before an independent and impartial body signifi cantly increases 
the level of protection of all human rights and can thus also have a positive impact on 
patients’ access to medicines to the extent that it is part of the right to health. The South 
African TAC case provides a good example of how adjudication of the right to health 
can play an important role in ensuring that accessibility and affordability of medicines 
are taken seriously by the state as part of an enforceable and justiciable right to health. 
As such, it may provide inspiration for other (developing) countries dealing with similar 
public health problems. It is to be hoped that the South African and Indian experience 
will encourage other countries to also acknowledge the justiciable nature of socio-
economic rights.
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